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THE NECESSITY OF IMAGINATION: USING
THE COUNTERFACTUAL METHOD TO
OVERCOME INTERNATIONAL LAW’S
EPISTEMOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS
—Mohsen al Attar*

Abstract As a social phenomenon, law is subject to countless influences that shape its contours. This quality is compounded in international law, where the regime contends
with the contexts, cultures, and complexities of disparate
nation-states. Yet, despite international law’s evident contingency, few publicists explore the implications of this quality,
preferring to engage with the regime from within the dominant history and logic. This approach narrows both scholarly imagination and regulatory potential, confining us to
a contingent status quo. In the following article, I argue for
the use of counterfactuals in international legal scholarship
to, first, enrich our understanding of the biases that inform
our thinking and, second, disrupt scholarly engagement with
international law. Today’s international legal order is beset
by an array of wicked problems. Since the international law
we know is culpable in the rise of these problems, it is shortsighted to rely on the culprit when looking for solutions.
Counterfactuals are an effective instrument in stimulating
new modes of thought and helping us appreciate that what is
could very well be part of the problem.

I. CHARTING A CULTURALLY REPRESENTATIVE
FUTURE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
One of the paradoxes of international law is that it is often under siege from
its proponents.1 Across the panoply of critical international legal scholarship,
*
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we find viewpoints that challenge, sometimes condemn aspects of the regime,
from its Eurocentric history to its contemporary inequity. Yet, the source of
their opprobrium is laden with irony: they believe international law can be better than it is.2
At the core of this body of critical scholarship is concern around the cultural misrecognition and political misrepresentation that pervades international
law.3 Both inequities draw water from the same well: the over-privileging of
Eurocentrism in the design and operation of the international legal regime.4 As
detailed across multiple counter-narratives of international law, it was established to legitimise the imperial ambitions of European states during the era of
conquest, and mostly to mediate competition between imperial rivals.5 Despite
decolonisation and the extension of sovereignty to postcolonial states, international law remains rooted in its origins, with emergent states expected to comply — and often committed to complying — with the established order.
Yet, the order remains partial in many ways, including its overarching epistemology.6 Born of a Eurocentric viewpoint, the world was ordered — geographically, politically, and sociologically — as Europe wished it to be. Under
these circumstances, resistance was inevitable as emergent states sought cultural and political representation on par with that of former imperial powers.
However, the challenge proved existential as their cultural practices and preferences were often treated as incongruent with the precepts of international law,
which were historically regarded as stand-ins for the principles of civilisation.7
Hence the demands for cultural recognition and political representation emerging today: postcolonial states are not only eager to sit at the table, they wish to
set the agendas and to chair the meetings.
It is at this point that international law retreats into its reactionary character. Despite the clear contingency of the regime, proponents of the status quo
— perhaps its priests — treat it as sacrosanct and impervious to renewal. For
critical international legal scholars, allegiance to the status quo triggers a paradox.8 Despite their virulent condemnation of international law’s origins, they
remain committed to its progeny. Their critiques are caught in a Gordian knot:
having already showed their hand, those content with the status quo need only
call their bluff knowing that they will continue playing anyway. We might be
2
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al Attar (n 1).
Nancy Fraser, ‘Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World’ (2005) 36 New Left Review 69.
Anne-Charlotte Martineau, ‘Overcoming Eurocentrism? Global History and the Oxford
Handbook of the History of International Law’ (2014) 25 European Journal of International
Law 329.
Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (CUP 2004).
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(DUP 2018).
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more charitable and proclaim that the commitment of critical scholars is not
to international law’s operational parameters but to the normative promise it
presents: a cooperative world order organised around sovereign equality and
human flourishing. Yet, the conclusion some reach is that the parameters stymie the promise, calcifying a legacy that is anything but equal and humane.
This conclusion, perhaps realisation is what produces the disaffection common
among critical scholars and explains the overriding paradox.9
To advance the movement toward the cultural recognition and political representation that critical scholars seek, I propose in this article mainstreaming
the use of the counterfactual method.10 It is an attractive device for renewal-minded scholars for it facilitates the exploration of alternative legal imaginaries. By crafting what if scenarios, use of the counterfactual method creates
an opportunity to engage not just with different regulatory possibilities, but
also with different underlying epistemologies.11 Despite the contingency of
many features of international law, we present and practise them as though
they were sacrosanct. This presumption undermines our efforts toward renewal
as we take for granted the prejudicial precepts we rage against.
As I argue, the counterfactual method provides an escape from the conundrum. If deployed well, critical international legal scholarship add a new
dimension to the critical disposition. What critical scholars often lament is the
absence of creation or of imagining alternatives to the status quo. For example,
this is the essence of Bhupinder Chimni’s Manifesto where he gently chides
critical scholarship for failing “to effectively critique neo-liberal international
law or [to] project an alternative vision of international law”.12 While I think
Chimni is over-egging the pudding, I take his point: identifying shortcomings
within the extant regime is vital but no more so than methodically exploring
how it could be otherwise. By centring the contingency of international law, on
one hand, and (temporarily) suspending our commitment to it on the other, the
possibilities for renewal multiply.13
I proceed in four parts. In the first, I highlight the contribution critical
international legal scholars — with emphasis on Third World Approaches
to International Law (‘TWAIL’) — have made to debates about international law. The counter-narrative method has transformed our understanding
of the regime, underscoring the brutalities that gave rise to the contemporary system. Next, I link the limitations of critical scholarship to the rise of
regional approaches to international law. Following the decolonisation era,
9
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new alliances of sovereign states from different continents began to influence
the development of international law in culturally bespoke ways. In the fourth
part, I describe the counterfactual method. While I begin with the method as
practised in the relevant scholarship, I also craft a critical approach that will
help the cause of TWAIL and others scholars who reject the sacredness of
Eurocentric epistemology. I conclude by arguing for the use of counterfactuals
to advance a more robust debate on pathways not just for legal reform, but for
legal renewal.

II. THE VALUE OF COUNTER-NARRATIVES
TO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY
Critical approaches to international law abound.14 In academic halls, we
have set aside the pontifications of naturalists and positivists alike.15 Formalism
persists, as professional legal practice demands, but even this is coloured with
sociological, historical, and cultural ruminations that add regional texture to
our understanding of the international legal regime.16 It would be misleading
to suggest that all publicists are critical now but, at a minimum, they recognise
the valuable contribution critical scholarship adds to deliberations about international law.17
The transition was inevitable. As international law’s history is described in
textbooks, it appears as little more than European outer-state law.18 Devised
during the imperial era, European states crafted a set of laws to advance
their territorial ambitions. Colonialism, slavery, and even genocide was permitted under the new Eurocentric order, so long as the actions were carried
out against peoples outside of Europe. Far more parochial than universal, the
rules European states crafted to govern international relations presupposed
what Antony Anghie termed a dynamic of difference.19 Only states that were
European in character merited statehood; others were to embrace the teachings
offered — via the cannon and the canon — to gain recognition from Europe.
Of course, the international law of yesteryear was built on a fallacy: that
14

15
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19

Fleur Johns, ‘Critical International Legal Theory’ in Mark A. Pollack and Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
International Legal Theory: Foundations and Frontiers (CUP 2019) <https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3224013> accessed 19 April 2021.
To provide some clarity, I’ve been predisposed toward critique from an early age. This disposition, cultivated by my surroundings and upbringing, informed much of my early thoughts
and now colours my scholarship. I am part of the TWAIL movement, though my thinking is
also informed by more radical anti-colonial scholarship including the works of Carmichael,
Davis, Fanon, Rodney, and Sankara. I am also enamoured with debates on decoloniality and
epistemic violence.
Tilmann Altwicker and Oliver Diggelmann, ‘What Should Remain of the Critical Approaches
to International Law: International Legal Theory as Critique’ (2014) 24 Swiss Review of
International and European Law 69.
ibid.
ibid.
Anghie (n 5).
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European subjectivity equates with human objectivity.20 This is the legacy upon
which mainstream international law rests.
Following Europe’s self-obliteration and the concurrent decolonisation of
the African and Asian continents circa mid-twentieth century, the narrative
of European supremacy began to fray before crumbling altogether. Hence
the inevitability of the transition: the fallacy was impossible to sustain in a
multipolar world. Legal scholars adapted, principally by embracing the critical
turn I opened this article with.
Fleur Johns argues that two phases denote critical approaches to international law.21 In the first, they took liberal legalism to task, demonstrating that
text and doctrine alone are inadequate tools for understanding either the operation or the character of international law.22 Koskenniemi’s indeterminacy
thesis captures this critique.23 In the second phase, Eurocentric critiques of
Eurocentric international law were displaced by, among others, Critical Race,
Feminist, Marxist, and TWAIL theories. New scholars were protesting against
“the ultra-white-male ethos of the New Left”.24 Anghie and Chimni captured
this shift in the pithiest of phrases: “indeterminacy very rarely works in favour
of Third World interests”.25 From there, critical international legal scholarship
soared.
TWAIL is, perhaps, the most recognised among critical international legal
theories.26 To some extent, this is due to the obviousness of the critique: no
matter how we measure life chances, it is evident that colonial legacies continue to blight those of formerly colonised regions. The theory thus speaks to
the experiences of large swathes of the global population. We might also mention the malleability of the critique. As Okafor, Mickelson, and I comment,

20
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ibid.
Johns (n 14).
Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law - 20 Years Later’ (2009) 20 European
Journal of International Law 7.
ibid. In his earlier work, Koskenniemi argued that international law, as interpretative practice,
is indeterminate. By this, he meant that two judges relying on the same facts, regulations,
and jurisprudence, can reach diametrically opposite conclusions (think majority opinion). Both
Judges are sincere in their analysis. Such is the nature of law that legal problems are intrinsically ill-structured, meaning multiple outcomes are possible, even desirable, hence law’s indeterminacy. His thesis is equally applicable to municipal law.
Johns (n 14) 7.
Antony Anghie and Bhupinder S Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and
Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’ (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of International Law
77, 101.
al Attar (n 1); Michelle Burgis-Kasthala, ‘Scholarship as Dialogue? TWAIL and the Politics
of Methodology’ (2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 921; Bhupinder S
Chimni, ‘The World of TWAIL: Introduction to the Special Issue’ (2011) 3 Trade, Law and
Development 14.
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TWAIL is many things to many people.27 Its flexibility facilitates wide-ranging
involvement which, at least according to Antony Anghie, was the aim. Last,
and I think this relevant for this article’s thesis, TWAIL scholars do not posit a
better universalism. On the contrary, they welcome interventions from an array
of constituencies, especially those historically marginalised within Eurocentric
international law. Cultural recognition and epistemological equivalency are
central to the TWAIL movement. It is an ideal canvas for the involvement of
disparate communities as well as for the exploration of different possibilities.28
Foremost, TWAIL is an analytical lens through which scholars can examine
elements of international law and global governance, while placing emphasis
on matters of relevance to Third World peoples and on perspectives that emanate from their region.29 Two patterns characterise TWAIL. First, its scholars
place great emphasis on the twin dichotomies of prejudice and privilege.30 Just
as we can only appreciate what is sweet by tasting what is bitter, prejudice
only makes sense when it is juxtaposed alongside privilege. In practical terms,
the bias that is experienced by some states manifests advantageously for others. To comment on international law with efficacy requires scholars to account
for this parasitical relationship.31 Second, these same scholars underscore critical scholarship’s symbiotic relationship with its nemesis.32 Critical international legal theory is ambivalent toward itself, for the interventions legitimise
the regime through the illusion of critique and accountability, ensuring international law’s preservation.33
To illustrate, I use positive discrimination as an analogy. By ‘favouring’ the
employment or admission of sole individuals from a historically disadvantaged
27

28

29
30
31
32
33

al Attar (n 1); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, ‘Critical Third World Approaches to International
Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both?’ (2008) 10 International Community Law
Review 371; Karin Mickelson, Ibironke Odumosu and Pooja Parmar, ‘Situating Third World
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Inspirations, Challenges and Possibilities’ (2008)
10 International Community Law Review 351.
Consider this (imperfect) selection of TWAIL scholarship to appreciate the inclusivity
the movement pursues: Hiroshi Fukurai, ‘Fourth World Approaches to International Law
(FWAIL) and Asia’s Indigenous Struggles and Quests for Recognition under International
Law’ (2018) 5 Asian Journal of Law and Society 221; Muhammad Azeem, ‘Theoretical
Challenges to TWAIL with the Rise of China: Labor Conditions under Chinese Investment
in Pakistan’ (2019) 20 Oregon Review of International Law 395; Mark A Chinen, ‘Crumbs
from the Table: The Syrophoenician Woman and International Law’ (2012) 27 Journal of Law
and Religion 1; Fernanda Cristina de Oliveira Franco, ‘TWAIL’s Opportunities and Challenges
in the Latin American Context from Indigenous Peoples’ Perspectives to International Law’
(2015) 12 Brazilian Journal of International Law 227; Corri Zoli, ‘Islamic Contributions to
International Humanitarian Law: Recalibrating TWAIL Approaches for Existing Contributions
and Legacies’ (2015) 109 American Journal of International Law Unbound 271.
Okafor (n 27).
al Attar (n 1).
Martineau (n 4).
al Attar (n 1).
Robert Knox, ‘What is to be Done (With Critical Legal Theory)?’ (2011) 22 Finnish Yearbook
of International Law 32.
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or disenfranchised group, decision-makers give the illusion of concern about
both the under-representation of some and over-representation of others. As
critics argue, the intervention is piecemeal and designed to placate rather than
reform. If the problem is systemic — as is the case with discrimination — then
individual interventions will not redress the underlying cause. It is the equivalent of treating symptoms rather than illnesses. The same applies to international law. If it is the aetiology and epistemology of international law that
reproduce predatory relations, then preserving the regime while implementing
amendments, will do little to alter the underlying ill. Consider, for example,
the Doha Development Round or developmental aid in general. If exploitation
underpins global capitalism and the rules are designed to favour the strongest
participants, tweaks at the margins will appease more radical demands, allowing the benefactors to plead good intentions and to rescue the regime. Few
critical scholars pursue international law’s radical re-imagination, preferring to
trim at the edges.
Beyond the analytical and introspective lenses, TWAIL also puts forward a
variety of methods for the examination of international law, the most prominent of which is the counter-narrative.34 TWAIL scholars excavate the inequitable outcomes that manifest for those beyond the Eurosphere via international
law. They, thus, leverage history’s dynamic and multifarious character to retell
imperial fantasies as the nightmares they were for those on the receiving end.
With the democratisation of global society following decolonisation, it was
only a matter of time before new narratives of international law emerged.35
And they have.
Across the collection of TWAIL scholarship, we find a series of exposés of
histories and herstories of international law. Many possess a critical character
as the author challenges the established narrative, unearthing threads, experiences, and perspectives that orthodox scholarship omits.36 While critique is
central to the counter-narrative, TWAIL scholars — like other critical theorists
— do not limit themselves to a counter-chronicling endeavour. Throughout
their works, they explore the legacies of Eurocentrism in the continued operation of international law.37 Despite the putative democratisation of the world,
international institutions — like international relations — remain hopelessly
34
35

36

37

Burgis-Kasthala (n 26).
It is worth mentioning that resistance to European imperialism was continual. Lorca has
excavated numerous examples from Latin America just as Rajagopal has from across the
Asian continent. We can go further and explore the works of historian such as CLR James
and Hilary Beckles as well as postcolonial scholars such as Gopal and Spivak, all of whom
unearth perpetual resistance and, at least in the case of Gopal, encourage the development of
a non-linear account of history including the present moment. Amy Maguire, ‘Contemporary
Anti-Colonial Self-Determination Claims and the Decolonisation of International Law’ (2013)
22 Griffith Law Review 238.
Antony Anghie, ‘LatCrit and Twail’ (2012) 42 California Western International Law Journal
311, 318.
Zoli (n 28).
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imbalanced; colonial legacies are tempered, to be sure, but even today overt
(e.g. the Security Council) and covert (e.g. duty to protect) biases prevail.
While they often begin with the counter-narrative, TWAIL scholars quickly
shift into the critical, achieving both scholarly rigour and political relevance in
the process. The conclusion is self-evident: barring a colossal act of collective
renewal, the original sin of international law will continue to haunt the edifice,
reproducing prejudicial outcomes over and over again.
While the critique does not end there, TWAIL and critical scholars, in general, are stricken by a sense of paralysis.38 As I highlight in the introduction,
early TWAIL scholars such as Chimni bemoan TWAIL’s failure to disrupt the
production of international law (though they concede that the narrative will
never be the same).39 Despite the purchase of his critique, I believe he overstates it. Third World jurists, as early as the 60s and 70s, proposed the New
International Economic Order and Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources doctrine.40 Each of these challenges received wisdom and were
humoured before being overrun by the centres of power. If we look further
afield, we locate the Drago Doctrine and Calvo Clause, two early twentieth
century attempts to inject Third World interests into international law.41 We
must contextualise our lack of success, and account for the world in which
attempts at reform manifest.
Since Chimni’s early reflections, we observe heightened degrees of introspection by TWAIL scholars.42 Over the past decade, two strands of thinking about the challenges facing TWAIL — and critical approaches in general
— dominate. For some, the critique is nihilistic. To say that international law
is prejudicial at an aetiological level, leaves little room to manoeuvre. If the
38
39
40
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al Attar (n 1).
Chimni (n 12).
Margot E Salomon, ‘From NIEO to Now and the Unfinishable Story of Economic Justice’
(2013) 62 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 31.
Arnulf Becker Lorca, ‘Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of
Imposition and Appropriation’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 475. The Calvo
Clause, the brainchild of Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo, set forward the principle that jurisdiction over international investment disputes rests with the host country. Calvo wished to
restrict the ability of European states to deploy armed intervention to enforce the demands
of private actors, a practice that was pervasive at the time. Likewise, Luis Drago, also
Argentinian and the then Foreign Minister, argued at the turn of the twentieth century that
public debt operates beyond the purview of state-to-state relations. Building on the Calvo
Clause, he further argued that private creditors should be prohibited from calling upon the
military support of their states to enforce an existing liability and must instead avail themselves of the domestic legal regime. Both since developed into preeminent principles in international economic law.
Azeem (n 28); Srinivas Burra, ‘TWAIL’s Others: A Caste Critique of TWAILers and Their
Field of Analysis’ (2016) 33 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 111; George Galindo,
‘Splitting TWAIL’ (2016) 33 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 37; Kwadwo AppiagyeiAtua, ‘Ethical Dimensions of Third-World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): A
Critical Review’ (2015) 8 African Journal of Legal Studies 209.
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dynamic of difference is embedded within the regime, it is impossible to countenance alternatives. For others, the confrontation is epistemological: it is not
about supplanting European subjectivity with universal objectivity, it is the
way in which Eurocentrism informs our thinking about what is subjective,
objective, universal, and legal.43 To ask whether it is possible to escape modernity, is the equivalent of asking whether we can escape ourselves.
Since answering either question in the context of this article is impossible,
I only tackle the epistemological one in the remainder of this article. I choose
the epistemological challenge for the rise in scholarship on regional approaches
to international law portends a possible way forward, one that coheres with
the method I encourage TWAIL scholars to explore in the penultimate section of this article: the counterfactual. To take one example, the Asian continent, inhabited by 60% of global population has made several important
contributions to international legal relations including, among others, the Five
Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, the tradition of Asian values, and the
Bandung Declaration.44 Yet, they are mostly excluded from mainstream thinking about international law, reduced to regional constructs. Not without irony,
Simon Chesterman explains their exclusion from an Asian perspective,
Asian states have consistently been slowest to form regional
institutions, the most reticent about acceding to major international treaties, the least likely to have a voice in proportion
to their relative size and power and the wariest about availing
themselves of international dispute settlement procedures.45
He does not end there, urging publicists to account for Asian practices for
“the centre of gravity is clearly shifting towards Asia” certain to raise questions about the future “content of international law and the nature of its institutions”.46 Regional publicists, we must conclude, are breaking the Western
monopoly over the practice of international law.

43
44

45

46

Mignolo and Walsh (n 6).
Simon Chesterman, Hisashi Owada and Ben Saul (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
International Law in Asia and the Pacific (OUP 2019); Fukurai (n 28); Bhupinder S Chimni,
‘Asian Civilizations and International Law: Some Reflections’ (2011) 1 Asian Journal of
International Law 39.
Simon Chesterman, ‘Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law and Institutions: Past,
Present and Futures’ (2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 945, 957. As observed
by an astute reviewer, Chesterman’s piece is not without its problems. Two stand out: first,
scholars dispute his framing of Asian practices as well as the homogeneity he presumes
and, second, throughout his scholarship, we note an assumption that regional practices must
be funnelled through a Eurocentric lens. Both critiques are potent but neither undermine
the value of regionalism in the development of international law. On the contrary, even
Chesterman’s deviations accentuate the need for more research.
ibid 966–67.
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To understand the implications, I begin with background on the rise of
regionalism.

III. WHAT’S REGIONALISM GOT TO DO
WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW?47
All laws develop within a legal system, itself a sociological phenomenon
that mediates relations between disparate constituents. This simple formulation
highlights key facets of international law: a sociological system designed to
organise interactions between sovereign states. Like municipal law, to understand international law, we must engage with the sociological and the cultural.
This is easier said than done. International law lays claim to universality, yet
there is neither a global culture nor a world society to inspire the framework.48
Instead, since the days of Francisco de Vitoria, what we have is a regional
framework that its interlocutors posit as universal and seek to impose upon
the world. Here I summarise Anghie’s thesis, as detailed in Imperialism,
Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law.49 To return to my earlier
point, mainstream international law is European outer-state or regional law
and nothing more. Malcolm Shaw, author of the most prominent textbook on
international law, argues the same: the “nineteenth century development of the
law of nations [was] founded upon Eurocentrism and imbued with the values
for Christian, urbanised and expanding Europe” and the associated principles
“enshrined the power and domination of the West”.50 In the decolonisation era,
the challenge for postcolonial states was to adapt the regime to the cultural
practices and predilections that denote their societies.
The challenge manifested at two levels. First, mainstream law was treated
as fait accompli. To even join the club of sovereign states required a postcolonial mimicking of the mores and structures of Europe.51 Second, many
postcolonial states reflected Eurocentrism back to the metropolis, sometimes
comedically described as being more British than Britain. To break with
47

48
49
50
51

It is vital to note that we note strong ties between regionalism and critical approaches.
Embedded within international law is a form of ethno-chauvinism as Europe arrogated to
itself the authority to speak on behalf of a mystical universalism. The critique of this is obvious, at least it is today. It is easy to see how this false universalism would produce investigations into regional alternatives, the latter of which are proliferating. In this paper, I do not go
beyond stating the obvious: that regionalism and critical scholarship can be both comfortable
and awkward bedfellows. As others have noted, the rise of ethno-chauvinism is not exclusive
to Europe alone and some of these reactionary movements deploy the language of regionalism to state their case. This is evident in countriss as culturally and geographically distant as
Australia, France, India, and South Africa.
al Attar (n 1).
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (n 5).
Malcolm Shaw, International Law (8th edn, CUP 2018) 28–29.
Sundhya Pahuja, ‘The Postcoloniality of International Law’ [2005] Harvard International Law
Journal 459.
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Eurocentric epistemology thus demanded breaking with the self, an altogether
more harrowing endeavour. For much of international law’s history, compliance
with the cultural precepts of Europe was thus the standard-bearer.
We face here the epistemological challenge in all its glory. If compliance
with European regional law is the basis of participation in the international
legal order, postcolonial states are committing to their own epistemological
disenfranchisement.52 They remain subservient to a foreign epistemology in
all matters international. What is more, with the proliferation of interlinkages
between international and domestic law, these states experience a gradual harmonisation with the legal — and thus cultural — predilections of their former
colonial overseers.53
In sociology, Aníbal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, and Catherine Walsh have
explored this conundrum at length.54 The colonial matrix of power, as they
term it, is embedded within the institutions and ideologies of modernity including international law. To Quijano, coloniality is not limited to colonisation.
Instead, it was — he would say is — a process of cognitive capture that comes
to inform the experiences and aspirations of postcolonial peoples. When we
account for the manner in which international law developed — superimposed
upon the world during the colonial era — Europe elevated a single civilisational trajectory above all others, hence my earlier reference to European subjectivity posing as human objectivity.
Through this lens, the reimagination of international law gains an altogether
different character. Decolonisation was once the focus of aspirational states.
This made sense, at the time, but its limitations are now evident. When examined through the prism of coloniality, we come to undertand that the challenge
to reforming international law exists at an epistemological level. The legal
regime is not merely a rule book for international relations, but a cultural code
for human interaction. Attempts to harmonise state relations via the regime of
international law are thus attempting to standardise culture, an impossible task.
For critical theories such as TWAIL, the challenge becomes existential.
The pursuit of decolonisation rather than decoloniality undergirds much
of the TWAIL corpus.55 The position is sensible, even if counterproductive.
Colonisation touched upon all facets of Third World peoples’ existence: political, economic, and cultural.56 Deploying varying degrees of brutality, Europe
52
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Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the
Politics of Universality (CUP 2011).
Ko Hasegawa, ‘Normative Translation in the Heterogeneity of Law’ (2015) 6 Transnational
Legal Theory 501.
Mignolo and Walsh (n 6).
Pahuja (n 51).
Antony Anghie, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law’ (1996) 5
Social & Legal Studies 321.
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exerted dominion over the lives and lands of peoples interspersed throughout
the world. Freeing themselves from these shackles thus took centre stage in
liberation movements. Capitalising on the model of civilisation available, state
sovereignty was the concept around which Third World struggles coalesced.
Constructions of sovereignty, however, are also culturally informed.57 While
embracing sovereignty and its accessories was sensible, including its commitment to international law, it also ran against cultural autonomy. Liberation
struggles found themselves in the contradictory position of advocating freedom
on one hand, while coddling the same politico-economic structure — the colonial matrix of power — upon which the denial of their civilisation was fashioned.58 To paraphrase Ngugi, the night of the gunboat was followed by the
morning of the blackboard.
Third World jurists and scholars are aware of the dark side of sovereignty
and statehood. Still, decolonisation understood as the routing of imperial powers remained at the heart of the struggle. In a reflection on TWAIL, Bedjaoui
celebrates political realism.59 It is only once the exodus is achieved that postcolonial states could deliberate and pursue their preferred modes of organisation and governance. To our chagrin, neither the deliberation nor the pursuit
happened as a form of autopoiesis manifested: Eurocentric state logic sustained
itself, transferred to a new postcolonial ruling elite.
By supporting this approach to liberation, TWAIL and others tread close to
the same retrograde model of power that enabled Third World conquest. Nor
is this surprising: the questions we ask and the answers we offer are “a consequence of being embedded and living in a Western imaginary enveloped in the
process of becoming itself”.60 To counter this, we pursue liberation by developing new ways of thinking, knowing, and being. What does this mean for critical international legal scholars? As alluded to above, it means we “[transcend]
rather than [dismantle] Western ideas [by] building our houses of thought”,
the theorising and praxis of decolonial liberation in law.61 Decoloniality thus
appears as a more rigorous task than decolonisation.
Breaking from the dominant epistemology, especially in the context of
international law, is complicated, perhaps the greatest euphemism of this
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article. I note the rise of scholarship on the others of international law including African, Asian, Chinese, Indigenous, and Islamic approaches to international law. Rather than settling for the colonial construct, with all the
baggage that this entails, scholars seek to do as Mignolo urges: to transcend
Western thought by developing regional epistemologies that will inform
bespoke approaches to the regulation of international relations. These efforts
are emblematic of the pluriverse that characterises — or should characterise — a multi-polar world. Instead of visualising international law as an orbit
that envelops humanity, we treat its regional iterations as satellites, each of
which services a specific region. Like a Venn diagram, there are matters and
moments of overlap, but these are still guided by the broadcasting cultural
construct.
For critical international legal theorists, this involves renouncing the singularity of European epistemology in the fashioning of international law. Ways
of knowing permeate other cultures as well, meaning each is capable of articulating their own preferences for international law.62 Epistemological innovation
becomes the struggle itself, countering the misrecognition and misrepresenta
-tion that result from epistemic singularity.63 It also creates space for the
development of unique ways of thinking about the regulation of international
relations.64
We find variations of this model of critical and epistemological engagement
from across regions. Babatunde Fagbayibo, for example, articulates a variant of
this model in relation to African thought.65 “Many universities prescribe EuroAmerican textbooks that pay little or no attention to African epistemic realities”, Fagbayibo argues, further noting that legal scholars of international law
mostly assign “reading materials [that] stick to Eurocentric canons”.66 By treating European thought as a disciplinary foundation, the scope of representation
is constricted. Most of all, Fagbayibo laments the self-immolation that this
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action conveys for a plethora of African materials on international law, both
historic and contemporary, prevail.
James Gathii argues a similar point, recounting the breadth of jurisprudence
on diplomacy, trade, and peace that emerged across pre-colonial African cities such as Carthage as well as kingdoms such as Mali, Kongo, and Songhai.67
Yet, as Fanon observed in the decolonisation period, the drive to “inferiorise and eliminate any trace of African knowledge systems” pervades international legal scholarship, whether produced by African or European jurists
alike.68 Making a similar point, Fagbayibo further argues that the development of African epistemologies — notice his use of plurality — will transform
our understanding of international legality. By adding African epistemologies
to the intellectual debate, future relations within and beyond African borders
become more representative, moving us closer to the orbiting satellites and
Venn diagram I referenced earlier.69 Without epistemic plurality, we are wedded to the truncated universalism that mainstream international law is capable
of.
Scholars have executed a comparable exercise in relation to the Asian continent. I identified the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, the tradition of Asian values, and the Bandung Declaration earlier. I also recounted
Chesterman’s explanation. Reticence notwithstanding, Chesterman believes
the response of mainstream publicists is imprudent. “The centre of gravity is clearly shifting towards Asia” and “the more interesting question” for
international law is about the jolt the move will trigger “on the content of
international law and the nature of its institutions”.70 He proposes a range
of pathways for the future of regional international law, each of which warrants further research, and I direct the reader to this useful oeuvre.71 There is
more. Consider the efforts of the Centre for International Law (‘CIL’) and the
Foundation for the Development of International Law in Asia (‘DILA’). Noted
TWAIL scholars, Antony Anghie and Lee Seok-Woo, are at the heart of each
respectively. Asia “is traditionally viewed as ‘rule takers’ rather than ‘rule
makers’” according to Anghie yet, over the past generation, the continent “is in
various ways now playing a role in the making of international law”.72 Anghie
has since launched his Teaching and Researching International Law in Asia
project (‘TRILA’).
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He began the project with a conference. Held in 2018, the aim was to
explore and gather data on Asian approaches to international law, including its
pedagogy and research. Among attendees, 85% expressed a desire to consolidate and articulate an Asian consensus on international law. Partly motivated
by regionalism, they wished to counter “strong Eurocentric currents pervading
the field”.73 A further 64% of participants proclaimed that an Asian perspective already exists. The report highlights substantive matters but also levels
of abstraction. According to Radvindra Pratap, certain “international issues,
such as diplomatic relations, nuclear testing, state responsibility, food security and counter terrorism” are areas “in which Asian states have developed
shared positions and an Asian perspective can be considered”.74 Like Lee SeokWoo, who I describe in the next paragraph, Pratab belives that Asian states
have developed regional practices in international law, some of which differ
from those of other continents. Certainly, there are particularities to Asian
conceptions of state responsibility and food security where the eponymous
Asian values are relied upon when crafting regional treaties. His argument
is less persuasive with regards to nuclear testing if we consider the distinct
approaches adopted by China, India, Pakistan, and South Korea. Nishara
Mendis and Chen Yifeng concur while cautioning against the pursuit of cultural relativity in international law. The aim of regionalism is to develop forms
of international law that are more representative of groups historically excluded
from its formulation, such as women.75
Lee Seok-Woo adopts an approach germane to the CIL, seeking to expose
“materials on [international law] practice and development from Asia”, an
objective he regards as a priority for the region.76 A challenge for international legal scholars is to gain knowledge about state practice across countries.
Most texts, Lee asserts, remain Eurocentric and a dearth of resources from
non-Western countries translates into the exclusion of practices from beyond
the Eurosphere. He developed the DILA project “to disseminate international
law in Asia and promote contacts and cooperation to deal with questions of
international law relating to the continent”.77 He includes here the publication
of the Encyclopaedia of Public International Law in Asia (‘EPILA’). The first
of its kind, the text reviews and analyses state practice from twenty Asian
countries over a period of thirty years.
Lee is convinced that the variety of cultures interspersed across the Asian
continent poses no impediment to the development of a strong regional
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approach to international law. He refers to “a strong, albeit undefined, feeling of familiarity, mutual understanding, and even coherence and solidarity”
among Asian states.78 Like other TWAIL scholars, he returns to the exclusionary character of modern international law: “a shared experience of domination
and dominance from without and within, both in the form of downright colonization, semi-colonization, as well as other forms of repression” compels a
systemic approach toward the development of Asian international law.79
My third example draws from an essay by Balraj Sidhu.80 Sidhu argues that
ancient India, as far back as 600 BCE, developed its own Law of Nations. For
obvious reasons, the sources are intertwined with the Hindu religion, much
like the Siyar or Islamic international law.81 Religious subjectivity is frequently exploited by mainstream publicists to deny their value for a pluriversal
approach to international law. Yet, this ethnocentric outlook denies two characteristics of modern international law: first, Christianity is the foundation of the
current iteration and, second, favouring a putative secular approach to international law is itself a culturally subjective viewpoint.82 Many other societies
believe that their affairs should be guided by their religious precepts. Similar
to other Asian societies, Sidhu argues that the domination of Western ideology renders other modes of thinking subservient. She ends by intimating that
legal scholars from outside Europe have “a moral responsibility…to shape a
future international law that is more equal and representative”.83 For Sidhu, this
begins by restoring “the international legal rules well laid in ancient India”.84
Clear from these examples is that the development of regional approaches
toward international law is flourishing. Obstacles abound, of course, including the ability to instrumentalise these approaches. We must also wait and see
whether the same Eurocentric epistemology comes to dominate regional iterations of international law. From the perspective of critical international legal
theory, the developments are both liberating and enriching. As highlighted in
decoloniality scholarship, epistemological innovation stands as the final frontier
to cognitive sovereignty.
To advance this mission, I propose that critical scholars go one-step further
and introduce a simple and effective method into their repertoire. Subject of an
edited anthology, the counterfactual is an effective approach toward stimulating
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reflection on the renewal of international law.85 While I do not argue against
the counter-narrative, I observe that, in the context of critical international
legal theory, it has achieved its aim: few scholars deny either international
law’s barbaric past or the contingency of contemporary world order. Yet, I
believe that TWAIL and critical scholars can do more to alter academic reflection on international law. As I explain in the forthcoming section, the counter-factual is a promising intervention.

IV. ‘WHAT IF’ AS AN INTELLECTUAL PROVOCATION
Not all participants in the TRILA conference highlighted in the preceding
section are sympathetic to regionalism. “However unfair and skewed [international law’s] history was, an international legal system [exists]”, according to
Ebrahim Afsah, but “any other system built to mediate the interests of hostile
states would look very much the same”.86 Afsah’s position is problematic for
multiple reasons, the most notable of which is his overt denial of both contingency and indeterminacy in the development of international law. In response
to these types of assertions, common among formalists committed to the status
quo, scholars explore the famed — and infamous — what if? In their deliberations, they probe potential responses to the perennial question: how could
international law be otherwise?
“Saying that international law is contingent does not mean that it could have
taken any shape in equal probability” asserts Ingo Venzke: “it rather means
that the shape in which we find international law today was one possibility
among many”.87 Does Afsah truly believe that, had China rather than England
conquered much of the world, international law would look very much the
same? Opening oneself to this possibility stimulates both legal thinking and
legal theory, especially in the realm of international law where the prospective configurations are plentiful. In this section, I adumbrate the counterfactual
method, highlighting some of its foundations and some of its idiosyncrasies for
critical legal scholars.
At its core, the method facilitates the blossoming of alternative legal imaginaries. It is not simply a matter of imagination, but of methodical engagement
with proposals for the reform of international law. Within the regime, some
constraints have become sacrosanct, militating against modification, at least in
the immediate. The sovereign state is one example, though the interventions of
NGOs as amicus curiae and attempts to establish legal standing of companies
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within international courts suggest that even the sacred is contingent.88 The use
of the counterfactuals enables our imagination, as we work through the trajectory of an alternative imaginary.
Counterfactuals are also valuable in stimulating deliberation about obviously
contingent features of the international legal regime. Two facile examples come
to mind: first, the plutocratic distribution of voting power at the international
financial institutions and the absence of provisions on distribution in international economic law treaties. Counterfactuals help free “legal thinking from
false beliefs in the necessity of outcomes and developments”.89
What is counterfactual thinking? Some might recall Pascal’s clever assertion
about the world being different if Cleopatra had a shorter nose and averted the
interests of Marc Anthony. Shortly thereafter, a literary movement known as
uchronie developed, pursuing explorations into counterfactual histories or, as
the term implies, utopias of past times.90 The value is undeniable and I quote
Patrick Boucheron favourably: “history is capable of granting the rightful place
to future that were never realised, to the potentials that were never met”.91 To
tease out Boucheron’s point, it is essential to consider that arguments about
why something happened one way are, equally, commentary on why that same
thing did not happen another way. Such is the nature of historical study that
scholars read the accounts in accordance with a pre-existing hypothesis, even
bias.92 I am reminded of Achebe’s laconic reflection: until lions have their own
historians, the hunt will always glorify the hunter. To read history another way,
especially in a way that did not happen, is elucidative in its own right, helping
us to understand, first, why it unfolded the way it did and, second, how we
wish it might have.
Counterfactuals are a useful method for critical international legal scholars,
opening the door to investigations into international law’s genuine and false
contingencies. For example, had the African continent pursued a re-drawing of
its map as was mooted at the time — and later rehashed by Makau Mutua93
— would the continent have remained mired in internecine wars for as long
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as several regions did? We use the counterfactual not to better understand the
past, but to appreciate that the future is not predestined.
I admit this type of thinking is challenging, almost impossible for many
legal scholars. If law is anything, it is our prostration to the status quo. To
even countenance the redrawing of maps requires the subversion of an array
of international legal doctrines, before we even tackle the political and sociological upheavals that would follow.94 Still, the point is there. To the extent that
critical international legal scholars are motivated to explore epistemological
alternatives, it requires deep reflection not just on the way things are, but on
ways they could have been and, by extension, can still be. Exploring alternatives to the current trajectories unlocks that potential.
In an elucidative article that I reference above, Venzke provides a schematic
for thinking counterfactually.95 He sets forward core parameters, designed to
preserve reality “to the largest degree possible”.96 Too many modifications,
he cautions, would nullify the educative value of the exercise. A minimalist
approach guided by high probabilities is his preferred way forward. He further
notes that it is not only a matter of altering key events but of anticipating the
snowball effect. It is inevitable that the alteration of one element can produce
intended and unintended consequences alike. The effective use of the counterfactual method requires some mapping of the projected trajectory, adding
essential rigour to the exercise. There is more and I encourage readers curious about the counterfactual to engage with the work of Venzke, Lebow, and
Luhmann.
For critical international legal theorists, however, I advise operating beyond
the parameters of Eurocentric legal thinking. This might involve drawing on
alternate epistemologies, introducing new aspirations and benchmarks, and
challenging the status quo of international legality. Most of all, it involves dismissing the intellectual and ideological obligation to always measure our proposals against European international law.
For a critical cohort, this is perhaps what makes the counterfactual method
most useful. In addition to helping us home in on aspects of international law
that preserve a Eurocentric outlook, it also liberates us to explore what lay
beyond these parameters. For example, Venzke’s chief parameter involves a
commitment to reality, as he terms it, declaring that the counterfactual must
“arise from the context” if it is to be “realistic”.97 On its face, this sounds sensible: why operate in fantasy if the ambition is a better version of actual international law? Nevertheless, I question the value of sensibility in a world that is
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anything but. The historical record demonstrates over and over that even if the
Third World commits to international law, even if it plays by the rules, indeterminacy rarely works in its favour.98
To be even blunter, the Third World is consistently bludgeoned by context
and reality. Like the contingency of the reasonable person standard, the same is
true for a sensible approach to counterfactuals: in the context of international
law, for being sensible means operating within a Eurocentric epistemology. It
is a facile strategy that is consistently used to delegitimise demands deemed
incongruous with the status quo, and thus liable to weaken the grip of extant
power holders. It is gate keeping in its crassest expression, as John Reynolds
argues in his exploration of legal language.99
It is worth pointing out that I do not question the validity of Venzke’s counterfactual model. However, for critical international legal scholars who aspire
to more than a Eurocentric approach toward the regulation of international
relations,we must explore possibilities that exist beyond the underlying epistemology. Among critical scholars, the paradox I explain in the introduction is
pervasive. Frankly, with the current parameters, it will remain so. We must
acknowledge that European international law was designed to legitimise some
of the worst European depredations including slavery, genocide, conquest, colonisation, and imperialism. Even today, we have not broken with the predatory
character of the order established during the ascendancy of Europe. Relying on
European liberalism and law or, more to the point, committing to European
epistemology is hardly an effective strategy for breaking with the partialities
and prejudices embedded within the regime. They exist at an aetiological level.
Hence the importance of counterfactuals that break with Eurocentric presumptions: only then will we become cognisant of the (im)possibilities that the concept of international law offers. An example will help seal the point.
As a fellow international economic academic lawyer, Venzke is drawn
to examples from the regulation of international trade. In the same article,
he details the European Union’s (‘EU’) ban on the import and trade of seal
products, mainstays in both the Norwegian and Canadian economies. Those
familiar with seal hunting will appreciate the brutality of the practice; in
the worst scenarios, it involves the clubbing to death of seal pups, producing
macabre images of blood-soaked ice and seal skins. Almost to shame the EU,
Venzke draws attention to the massacre of garment workers in Bangladesh’s
Rana Plaza. Over 1100 workers were crushed and suffocated to death, as the
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manufacturing site collapsed onto itself and onto them, producing equally
heart-wrenching images. Hardly an isolated incident, brutal working conditions are commonplace and well-known in fast-fashion factories. Venzke uses
the counterfactual to showcase the EU’s double-standards. Despite the putative
humane considerations that undergird the ban on seal products, no such consideration is offered to victims of the disposable fashion sector. I expect the
contours of Venzke’s counterfactual are now evident: he hypothesises about a
regime of international law that affords equal consideration to garment workers
and to seals. “The main point remains the exposure of imbalances…why does
the gruesome practice of clubbing seals trigger public action”, Venzke ponders,
“when the awful treatment of labourers in the garment industry is left to the
choices of consumers, guided by voluntary and largely ineffective labelling
schemes?”100
Venzke’s counterfactual is hard-hitting. Readers are provoked into a state
of contemplation, even guilt as we question our own consumptive habits. Does
each of us agree with the EU’s ranking exercise, endorsing the positioning of
the lives of seals above those of Bangladeshi garment workers? Since most are
likely to reject this ridiculous ordering, Venzke stimulates reflection about the
regulation of trade and the value of introducing compulsory standards in garment trade, similar in strength to the ones that protect baby seals.
While I found his counterfactual elucidative, it remains deeply Eurocentric.
First, it is telling that the best advocacy a progressive international economic
lawyer can muster is to demand that Bangladeshi labourers be elevated to
the level of seals. Second, at no point does he countenance the high probability that consumers are practising wilful blindness: that they are aware of the
racist exploitation that underpins the system, but comfortable with it so long
as it happens to others and preserves their purchasing power. Third, Venzke’s
counterfactual does not question capitalism, colonialism, or consumerism and
the legitimacy that his counterfactual bequeaths to each of these ideological
systems.
Venzke’s counterfactual ultimately flounders because of the parameters
he insists upon. His commitment to reality is also a commitment to the status quo; it’s more a matter of trimming than of cutting, of tweaking than of
imagining.101 This approach stymies the counterfactual’s transformative potential, locking international law into the underlying epistemology. We learn that
even counterfactuals — creative departures from what is — must pledge fealty
to reality, irrespective of reality’s contingency and prejudice. Critical scholars
devoted to advancing an international legal regime that is more representative
of Third World peoples must transcend these artificial boundaries if they are to
achieve the provocation and imagination that counterfactuals promise. Reality
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and probability are red herrings. The counterfactual method’s purpose is not to
build an alternate framework, but to generate awareness about aspects of international legal that are contingent. By so doing, we become courageous, even
indignant toward components that are presented as presumptive.
While these components might be critical to the intellectual integrity of
the regime as fashioned, we must recall that it is built on a Eurocentric epistemology — and thus subjectivity — posing as universal objectivity. Once we
acknowledge the partiality of the regime, even its mainstays fray, if not disintegrate altogether. For critical international legal scholars, this means probing counterfactuals that imagine international law beyond ideologies such as
capitalism that sustain the status quo.102 TWAIL provides a useful illustration.
The drive to develop an alternative international law to the mainstream runs
strong throughout the scholarship.103 While both its proponents and antagonists
highlight its failure to achieve this end goal, there is no denying the desire for
a regime more representative of Third World interests. Counterfactuals, I suggest, provide a stimulating way forward.
Counterfactual thinking can contribute to the advance of critical international legal theories such as TWAIL. For this to prove valuable, we must
eschew reasonableness. What are examples of unreasonable counterfactuals
that aid the cause of critical scholarship and of the Third World? These are too
numerous to itemise but some examples come to mind.
First, I would like to explore reversing the chain of authority between the
Security Council and the General Assembly. If democracy is a right and preferred form of governance, as repeatedly argued by the EU, the USA, and
liberal international lawyers, then it would be fascinating to consider its implications for international relations. I cannot think of a better way of testing the
implications of displacing Euocentrism within the international legal regime.
Second, instead of Europe and the USA enjoying nominating authority for the
heads of the WB and IMF, a stimulating counterfactual would involve shifting this authority to the African and Asian continents, or perhaps rotating the
authority geographically. Would this produce policies that are more favourable
to the impoverished populations of the world or, as some TWAIL scholars have
suggested, are pockets of the Third World more Eurocentric than Europe? A
third counterfactual of topical relevance is an open-source model of vaccine
development. We have already learned that most of the funding for the Oxford
University and AstraZeneca vaccine was derived from governments. A counterfactual might consider the implications of this if we eliminated patent rights
over pharmaceuticals altogether (much like India had prior to pursuing membership within the WTO). Would it improve access to life-saving drugs? Might
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we see the growth of manufacturing of generics beyond the usual players?
Would it give deeper meaning to notions of sovereignty and subsidiarity?
Last, I note that fusing the epistemological angle with counterfactuals is,
perhaps, the most promising undertaking of all. Venzke’s approach is limited
not solely because he insists on reality but also because he remains beholden
to a Eurocentric worldview. We can quibble over what exactly this means but
I suspect most will accept that a liberal Christian outlook is far removed from
a communitarian Muslim one and equally so from Confucian communism. We
must acknowledge that each of these civilisational traditions is epistemological in character. As such, notions of responsibility, equity, legality, cooperation, and aspiration, all of which correlate with international relations and thus
with international law, will look different when funneled through a distinct
worldview. The desire to preserve the status quo has the desired — though
not desirable — effect of excluding non-European epistemologies. Yet again,
the counterfactual presents a solution to the conundrum. How do international
legal scholars operating within an Islamic or communist frame propose to
tackle the legal issues that emerge during a global pandemic? What perspective
does Confucianism offer to deliberations on sovereign debt?
Again, the possibilities are endless for it is irrelevant whether Europe, or the
United States, or nuclear powers would agree to the counterfactual we design.
At its core, the counterfactual helps us appreciate the limits of our own thinking about international law, reflections adumbrated by a Eurocentric epistemology. Many of the truths we hold dear were devised to establish a dominant
position for European states in relation to others. For critical international legal
theory to prove useful to Third World states, our approach to counterfactuals
must involve jettisoning this prejudicial model, and the introduction of new
regional epistemologies to stimulate a geographically and culturally representative approach toward the regulation of international relations. The re-imagination of international law will only begin when we admit not just the force of its
prejudicial history, but also the opportunity that this admission presents.

V. BREAKING BAD: IMAGINING
INTERNATIONAL LAW BEYOND THE CONFINES
OF EUROCENTRIC RATIONALITY
Nothing in international law is either determinate or random.104 This does
not mean that every facet is contingent, rather, the contingency of the circumstances and interests inspire the law that we develop.105 Mainstream
international law was the product of imperialism, inter-imperial rivalry, and
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Eurocentrism. As it developed, the regime was logical for the circumstances,
especially to support the interests of emergent European states.106
The fallacy about mainstream international law is not with the logic but
with the suggestion that the logic could support decolonisation, sovereign
equality, and inter-generational justice. These concepts are incongruent with
the regime as originally contemplated. While the circumstances have since
changed, European interest in dominating the Third World persists; without
continued access, how else can Europe maintain a living standard that feeds on
the lands and lives of others?107 Without international law, as it is, Europe loses
an instrument that is vital to its ascendancy. Stated otherwise, European standards of living would inevitably wane.
For the Third World, the conundrum is existential. Third World cultures and
peoples can never be represented within international law for this would precipitate an end to the regime as it exists. We thus play at the margins while
preserving the core, holding out the possibility of equity and ignoring the probability of continuity.
Moving past this conundrum requires, first, thinking beyond it. Regional
approaches to international law, as described in the third section, are viable
and enriching explorations into alternative epistemologies. The counterfactual
method, as explicated in the fourth section, is another. What if quickly morphs
into what could, not to mention what should be. The act of posing these questions and, more importantly, exploring possible trajectories is a provocation,
both of law and of cognition. By pushing the boundaries of legal thought, we
explode the boundaries of legal imagination.
Again, I acknowledge this is not easy. As a social instrument, law seeks to
preserve the status quo. That is its dominant role. Due to the contingency of
the status quo, by so doing, the law privileges certain actors over others, acting
as an advantage privileged parties leverage to preserve the inequity they benefit from. International law is no different. Its historical contingency combines
with its structural logic to adumbrate a reality that some live and that many
more suffer.
Counterfactuals nurture imagination, enabling us to think beyond the contours that envelop and ensnare us. For critical scholars of international law to
use the counterfactual effectively, they must play with possibilities that exist
beyond the status quo. Far from the fantastical, counterfactuals that problematise the status quo nurture our imagination, expanding minds and thus possibilities. I do not claim the method as a panacea, but a promising approach
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when thinking about the renewal of international law, one that creates genuine opportunities for the recognition and representation of others in the development of a system that binds everyone. That, I argue, is a reality worth
imagining.

